Al-Shabaab’s Drones Come Out of Yemen
United Nations monitors have documented a Houthi weapons and training pipeline into Somalia that goes well beyond casual contact between two allied militant groups. A series of UN Security Council reports released over the past year describes what analysts call a structured, strategic partnership, not a one-off arms deal.
The 2024 evidence
The groundwork for that view was laid in mid-2024. The UN found that al-Shabaab received technical instruction from the Houthis and weapons shipments from Yemen between June and September that year, according to an analysis by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which follows the reporting closely. Those weapons were later used in al-Shabaab attacks on African Union forces in September and November 2024.
In August 2024, Puntland authorities arrested seven suspected al-Shabaab members and seized five suicide drones, physical proof that weapons as well as fighters were moving through the pipeline. The same month, the anti-Houthi Yemeni National Resistance Forces intercepted a vessel carrying hydrogen fuel cells that experts believe were meant to extend the payload and range of Houthi drones, according to a report on the growing ties between the two sides.
What moves through the pipeline has become clearer over time. Some of the equipment and parts traced to Iran appear to be locally assembled Samad-series drones, according to Taimur Khan, head of Gulf operations at Conflict Armament Research, cited by ISS Africa. The same analysis says UN monitors recorded al-Shabaab’s leaders asking Ansar Allah, the Houthis’ formal name, directly for “advanced weapons and training” in meetings in 2024. Al-Shabaab is shopping for an armed capability it does not yet have.
Deeper ties in 2025
A UN Security Council Panel of Experts report on Yemen, presented on 15 October 2025, found that cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabaab had “intensified to unprecedented levels”, covering weapons smuggling, military training and logistics, according to coverage of the report. The panel recorded two Houthi military engineers sent to Jilib, in southern Somalia, to teach al-Shabaab members drone modification and weapons maintenance. That is hands-on technical help, well past shipping hardware across the Gulf of Aden.
A separate UN Panel of Experts report on al-Shabaab in November 2025, reported by Africa Defense Forum, found the group had sent four groups of about 30 fighters each to Yemen for training over the previous year, one of them leaving Somalia’s Lower Shabelle coast by boat in late October 2024. Century International, cited by the regional broadcaster Kaab TV, estimated that between 120 and several hundred al-Shabaab fighters have been trained in Yemen.
Analysts are increasingly blunt that this is more than a transaction. The UN panel calls the cooperation “part of a Houthi strategy to wield increasing influence in the region”. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi said as early as March 2024 that he meant to push maritime operations toward the Indian Ocean, a statement the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has read as a signal that the Houthis are willing to use Somali territory to project power, partly as a testing ground for tactics. A retired US Navy rear admiral, quoted by Africa Defense Forum, put it simply: the Houthis supply advanced Iranian-backed weapons, al-Shabaab uses them to step up piracy and battlefield pressure in Somalia, and both groups extend their reach.
The attack that has not come
After two years of documented training, hardware transfers and seized suicide drones, al-Shabaab has still not carried out a confirmed armed drone strike of its own. Unmanned Africa reported separately that its smaller rival, Islamic State Somalia, crossed that line first, in January 2025 in Puntland’s Cali Miskat mountains, months after the same Houthi-linked smuggling networks were disrupted at Bosaso port.
Al-Shabaab, richer and more careful with its equipment, has kept its drones on surveillance and propaganda even as its access to armed technology has grown. That gap is why analysts rank Somalia among the most closely watched proliferation risks in Africa. Training, hardware, a willing supplier and a documented request for exactly this capability all appear to be in place. The attack itself has not happened yet.

